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Elections using Open Primaries lead to more autonomy being
granted for committees in State Legislatures.
State legislatures vary considerably in their organization, especially in the scope of leadership
powers and the degree of autonomy given to legislative committees.  Since the members
themselves often have power over how their own legislative bodies are organized, political
scientists have a keen interest in understanding why members choose to give committees
greater autonomy in decision-making. Tanya Bagashka and Jennifer Hayes Clark argue the
decision to grant more autonomy to committees is influenced by the type of electoral system
(open versus closed primaries) from which legislators are elected.
The importance of reelection to legislators is no mystery. For a legislator to follow through on
campaign promises and ultimately pass policies, it is necessary that she remains in office to see
proposals through to fruition.  Since legislators have control over the internal rules of the
legislature, they may alter rules in order to facilitate reelection.  For instance, members from
agricultural districts seek positions on the Agriculture Committee where they can have great
influence over agricultural policies and where they may also have the ability to can provide farm
subsidies or other benefits to their district.  This allows the member to claim credit to her
constituents to help secure reelection.
How much influence legislators have over policy and “bringing home the bacon” is related to committee system
autonomy, which refers to the extent to which committees are able to receive, screen, shape and affect the
passage of legislation.  If committees are truly autonomous, the rules would stipulate that all legislation has to be
referred to a committee for consideration before final passage.  Committee autonomy is greater when bills
referred to the committees do not have to be considered and/or reported back to the floor, when there are no
deadlines for committee action, and when it is more difficult to remove bills from the committees before the
committee has had a chance to act.  Consequently, legislators have greater control over policy and pork when
committees are more autonomous.  Committee members have great discretion in crafting bills, and once bills
reach a floor vote, non-committee members act in deference to the committee members.
In our current research, we argue that the level of autonomy legislators grant committees is directly related to the
inclusiveness of the selectorate, or the body of voters electing the legislator.  The inclusiveness of the selectorate
is dependent upon the types of primaries employed by state parties.  In the United States, the primary system is
the method by which most legislative candidates receive their party’s nomination, which allows them to contest
the general election under their party’s label.  State primaries vary in many ways, and one of these important
differences concerns who can participate in the state party’s primary. A number of state parties (e.g., Connecticut,
Florida, New York, and Pennsylvania currently) use a closed primary system in which voters must declare
membership of a particular party by a specific date prior to the election in order to vote in the primary.  Other
states (e.g., Michigan, Missouri, Minnesota, and Wisconsin currently) use open primaries which allows voters to
choose which party’s primary they opt to vote without a requirement of declaring membership to the party. Others
employ some variation or hybrid of the closed or open primary system (known as semi-open or semi-closed
primaries).
Open primaries are the most inclusive and encourage participation from cross-over voters and Independents
since the barriers of participating in the party’s primary is fairly low.  Closed primaries are the most exclusive and
discourage cross-over voting.  More inclusive primary systems motivate candidates to appeal directly to the
voters, circumventing party leaders.  Additionally, more inclusive primary systems require that candidates reach
out to a broader group of voters, many of whom may not be members of the candidates’ party.  On the flip side, in
exclusive systems (i.e., closed primaries), candidates are more beholden to party elites who maintain
considerable control over the process.
To address our question, we first gathered data on the methods of candidate selection in 24 states between 1955
and 1995, shown in Figure 1.  We then combined these data with committee autonomy scores created by Nancy
Martorano for the same states and time frame. Our analysis demonstrates that the inclusiveness of the
selectorate, or the body electing the candidates, does have a significant effect on committee autonomy.  When
candidates were elected through more inclusive primary systems (i.e., open primaries), they subsequently altered
rules to make committee systems more autonomous.
Figure 1: Primary System Type, 1955-95
We also investigated the effect of term limitations on committee system autonomy.  Since our argument assumes
that legislators do seek reelection, it is important to consider whether statutory or constitutional restrictions on
legislative service affect committee autonomy. From 1955 to 1995, only six states (Arizona, California, Florida,
Michigan, Ohio and South Dakota) had enacted term limits.  Our results revealed that term limits were not a
significant predictor of committee autonomy.
This research suggests that electoral considerations have broad effects on politics, not simply confined to
campaigns, but can also influence the very design of political institutions.  It has long been recognized that
institutional design has a profound influence over policy outcomes. Therefore, changes in electoral rules should
be evaluated not only on the basis of their potential influence over who can participate but also on their eventual
consequences for the design of our legislative institutions. 
This article is based on the paper ‘Electoral Incentives and Legislative Organization’ in State Politics & Policy
Quarterly.
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